Predatory Public Finance and the Evolution of the War on Drugs

Excerpt from Adam J. Hoffer and Todd Nesbit, eds., For Your Own Good: Taxes, Paternalism, and Fiscal Discrimination in the Twenty-First Century. Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2018.

38 Pages Posted: 4 May 2018

See all articles by Bruce L. Benson

Bruce L. Benson

Florida State University - Department of Economics; Florida State University College of Law

Brian Meehan

Berry College - Campbell School of Business

Date Written: January 3, 2018

Abstract

US drug policy has a long history of providing revenue for federal, state, and local governments. Before the War on Drugs, opium and cocaine were legal and medical professionals who prescribed these substances had to pay extra taxes to do so. This chapter explains how, as the federal government began enforcing outright bans on drugs, law enforcement agencies took advantage of their newly acquired authority to profit. Today, civil asset forfeiture related to drug crimes provides officers with incentives to use and abuse their authority and increase their revenue by making more drug arrests. Key takeaways: (1) Drug policy has a long history of providing law enforcement with increased revenues and authority over time. (2) Law enforcement agencies may be targeting the crimes that present the opportunity to raise revenue for their departments rather than the most serious public safety threats.

Keywords: war on drugs, tax policy, law enforcement, illegal drugs, civil asset forfeiture

JEL Classification: H2, K42

Suggested Citation

Benson, Bruce L. and Benson, Bruce L. and Meehan, Brian, Predatory Public Finance and the Evolution of the War on Drugs (January 3, 2018). Excerpt from Adam J. Hoffer and Todd Nesbit, eds., For Your Own Good: Taxes, Paternalism, and Fiscal Discrimination in the Twenty-First Century. Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2018., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3173785

Bruce L. Benson (Contact Author)

Florida State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Tallahassee, FL 30306-2180
United States
850-644-7094 (Phone)
850-644-4535 (Fax)

Florida State University College of Law

425 W. Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, FL 32306
United States

Brian Meehan

Berry College - Campbell School of Business ( email )

2277 Martha Berry Hwy NW
Mount Berry, GA 30149
United States

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