Tax Schemes for Sports Venues

20 Pages Posted: 4 May 2018

See all articles by Dennis Coates

Dennis Coates

University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Craig A. Depken

University of North Carolina at Charlotte - The Belk College of Business Administration - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 3, 2018

Abstract

Your tax dollars pay for sports stadiums. You read that right: your hard-earned money is given to billionaires to help fund their businesses and hobbies. In this chapter you’ll learn about the wide variety of taxes used to finance stadium and arena construction, and about who benefits the most from the construction of sports stadiums and arenas. Key takeaways: (1) Proposed stadium projects often give rise to rosy predictions that millions of dollars in benefits will flood the local economy, but studies after the fact often find a small or even negative impact on the economy. (2) The costs and benefits of taxation to subsidize stadiums need to be carefully considered; while policymakers tend to sell only the benefits, voters should be permitted to weigh stadium spending against alternatives.

Keywords: sports arenas, tax subsidies, sports, athletics, stadiums, tax policy, community development

JEL Classification: H2, H7, H71, L83, Z2

Suggested Citation

Coates, Dennis and Depken, Craig A., Tax Schemes for Sports Venues (January 3, 2018). Excerpt from Adam J. Hoffer and Todd Nesbit, eds., For Your Own Good: Taxes, Paternalism, and Fiscal Discrimination in the Twenty-First Century. Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2018., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3173824

Dennis Coates (Contact Author)

University of Maryland, Baltimore County ( email )

1000 Hilltop Circle
Baltimore, MD 21250
United States
410-455-3243 (Phone)
410-455-1054 (Fax)

Craig A. Depken

University of North Carolina at Charlotte - The Belk College of Business Administration - Department of Economics ( email )

Charlotte, NC 28223
United States

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