Rethinking the Relationship between Public Regulation and Private Litigation: Evidence from Securities Class Action in China
Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 2018 vol 19, 333-361
29 Pages Posted: 19 May 2018
Date Written: January 5, 2017
China has a civil procedure for collective litigation, which is dubbed Chinese-style class action, as it differs from the U.S.-style class action in some important ways. Using securities class action as a case study, this Article empirically examines both the quantity and quality of reported cases in China. It shows that the number of cases is much lower than expected, but the percentage of recovery is significantly higher than that in the United States. Based on this, the Article casts doubt on the popular belief that China should adopt the U.S.-style class action, and sheds light on the much-debated issue concerning the relationship between public and private enforcement of securities law. The Article also discusses the future prospects of securities class action in China in light of some recent developments which may provide its functional equivalents, including the regulator-brokered compensation fund and public interest group litigation.
Keywords: class action; securities regulation; China; administrative settlement mechanism; public interest group litigation
JEL Classification: K22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation