P2P Lenders versus Banks: Cream Skimming or Bottom Fishing?

86 Pages Posted: 8 May 2018 Last revised: 8 Oct 2021

See all articles by Calebe de Roure

Calebe de Roure

Reserve Bank of Australia

Loriana Pelizzon

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Anjan V. Thakor

Washington University, Saint Louis - John M. Olin School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: August 16, 2021

Abstract

We derive three testable predictions from a bank-P2P lender model of competition: (a) P2P lending grows when some banks are faced with exogenously higher regulatory costs; (b) P2P loans are riskier than bank loans; and (c) the risk-adjusted interest rates on P2P loans are lower than those on bank loans. We test these predictions against data on P2P loans and the consumer bank credit market in Germany and find empirical support. Overall, our analysis indicates that P2P lenders are bottom fishing, especially when regulatory shocks create a competitive disadvantage for some banks.

Keywords: P2P lending, bank lending, competition

JEL Classification: G21

Suggested Citation

de Roure, Calebe and Pelizzon, Loriana and Thakor, Anjan V., P2P Lenders versus Banks: Cream Skimming or Bottom Fishing? (August 16, 2021). SAFE Working Paper No. 206, Michael J. Brennan Irish Finance Working Paper Series Research Paper No. 18-13, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3174632 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3174632

Calebe De Roure

Reserve Bank of Australia ( email )

65, Martin Place
Sydney, NSW 2000
Australia

Loriana Pelizzon (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, D-60323
Germany

Anjan V. Thakor

Washington University, Saint Louis - John M. Olin School of Business ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,553
Abstract Views
5,409
rank
15,048
PlumX Metrics