Battles Around Legal Education Reform: From Entrenched Local Legal Oligarchies to Oligopolistic Universals. India as a Case Study

UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law, Vol. 3, 2018

UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2018-36

28 Pages Posted: 8 May 2018 Last revised: 18 Sep 2018

See all articles by Yves M. Dezalay

Yves M. Dezalay

University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)

Bryant Garth

University of California, Irvine School of Law; American Bar Foundation

Date Written: May 8, 2018

Abstract

This article, which is part of a longer book project, relates issues in the reform of legal education to the global diffusion of a “legal revolution” connected to US hegemony, financialization, and neo-liberal approaches to markets and governance. There is a growing openness in entry to the legal profession as art of the process, and more emphasis on meritocracy in relation to family capital. At the same time, however, inequality is exacerbated. There is a vast difference between the very few institutions at the top and the numerous institutions at the bottom. The legal revolution that goes with the revolution in governance, involving law schools, faculties of law, and corporate law firms, can be seen more specifically as part of a contested process — with legal education as a key battleground. There are both entrenched and even embattled elites resisting the forces promoting change as well as elites using multiple positions and connections to absorb and solidify the changes. India provides a case study of these battles and the role in India especially of the entrenched group of senior judges and elite advocates resistant to reform.

Suggested Citation

Dezalay, Yves M. and Garth, Bryant, Battles Around Legal Education Reform: From Entrenched Local Legal Oligarchies to Oligopolistic Universals. India as a Case Study (May 8, 2018). UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law, Vol. 3, 2018 ; UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2018-36. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3175454

Yves M. Dezalay

University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) ( email )

3, rue Michel-Ange
Paris cedex 16, 75794
France

Bryant Garth (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine School of Law ( email )

401 E. Peltason Dr.
Ste. 1000
Irvine, CA 92697-1000
United States
949-824-7230 (Phone)
949-824-0495 (Fax)

American Bar Foundation ( email )

750 N. Lake Shore Drive
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-988-6575 (Phone)
312-988-6579 (Fax)

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