Clawbacks, Holdbacks, and CEO Contracting

11 Pages Posted: 10 May 2018

See all articles by Stuart Gillan

Stuart Gillan

University of Georgia - Department of Finance

Nga Nguyen

Marquette University

Date Written: Winter 2018

Abstract

“Clawbacks” are much discussed in the context of senior executive compensation, yet the discussion has largely ignored the presence of holdbacks that are already in place in many firms. Holdbacks are deferred compensation that is potentially foregone in the event that the CEO leaves the firm without good reason or they are dismissed for wrong‐doing. They are explicit or written features of a CEOs employment contract. Holdbacks are already in use at 70% of S&P 500 firms and average $18.4 million each. Firms with higher CEO replacement costs, greater information asymmetry, a recent bad experience (fraud, lawsuit, or restatement), or in more certain environments are more likely to have a holdback. In contrast, clawback adoptions are mainly driven by firms' bad experiences and external pressure from shareholders. Holdbacks and incentive‐based compensation are substitutes, as termination incentives can reduce the need for incentive compensation. As managers reasonably demand a premium for accepting risky compensation, a measure of abnormal compensation is positively associated with holdbacks, but there is no significant association between clawbacks and holdbacks. These findings suggest that the holdbacks many firms already have in place could help an “ex‐post settling up” in the event of financial misconduct, or even simply misstated financials. As companies have more control over the amounts held back ex‐ante, holdbacks are potentially more efficient.

Suggested Citation

Gillan, Stuart L. and Nguyen, Nga, Clawbacks, Holdbacks, and CEO Contracting (Winter 2018). Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 30, Issue 1, pp. 53-61, 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3176249 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12277

Stuart L. Gillan (Contact Author)

University of Georgia - Department of Finance ( email )

Terry College of Business
Athens, GA 30602-6253
United States

Nga Nguyen

Marquette University ( email )

P.O. Box 1881
Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
2
Abstract Views
902
PlumX Metrics