Delegated Investment Decisions and Rankings

55 Pages Posted: 24 May 2018 Last revised: 31 Aug 2020

See all articles by Michael Kirchler

Michael Kirchler

University of Innsbruck

Florian Lindner

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Utz Weitzel

VU University Amsterdam

Date Written: August 30, 2020

Abstract

Two aspects of social context are central to the finance industry. First, financial professionals usually make investment decisions on behalf of third parties. Second, social competition, in the form of performance rankings, is pervasive. Therefore, we investigate professionals’ risk-taking behavior under social competition when investing for others. We run online and lab-in-the-field experiments with 805 financial professionals and show that professionals increase their risk taking for others when they lag behind. Additional survey evidence from 1,349 respondents reveals that professionals’ preferences for high rankings are significantly stronger than those of the general population.

Keywords: experimental finance, behavioral finance, social competition, rank incentives, financial professionals, delegated decision making, investment game, lab-in-the-field experiment

JEL Classification: G02, G11, D03, C93

Suggested Citation

Kirchler, Michael and Lindner, Florian and Weitzel, Utz, Delegated Investment Decisions and Rankings (August 30, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3177459 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3177459

Michael Kirchler

University of Innsbruck ( email )

Universitätsstraße 15
Innsbruck, Innsbruck 6020
Austria

Florian Lindner

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Utz Weitzel (Contact Author)

VU University Amsterdam ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam
Netherlands

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