Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: The Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives

42 Pages Posted: 14 May 2018

See all articles by Caterina Calsamglia

Caterina Calsamglia

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)

Chao Fu

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Economics

Maia Güell

University of Edinburgh

Date Written: May 2018

Abstract

We model household choice of schools under the Boston mechanism (BM) and develop a new method, applicable to a broad class of mechanisms, to fully solve the choice problem even if it is infeasible via the traditional method. We estimate the joint distribution of household preferences and sophistication types using administrative data from Barcelona. Counterfactual policy analyses show that a change from BM to the Deferred Acceptance mechanism would decrease average welfare by 1,020 euros, while a change to the top trading cycles mechanism would increase average welfare by 460 euros.

Suggested Citation

Calsamglia, Caterina and Fu, Chao and Güell, Maia, Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: The Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives (May 2018). NBER Working Paper No. w24588, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3177948

Caterina Calsamglia (Contact Author)

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Chao Fu

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Economics ( email )

Madison, WI 53706
United States

Maia Güell

University of Edinburgh ( email )

Old College
South Bridge
Edinburgh, Scotland EH8 9JY
United Kingdom

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