Governmental System and Economic Volatility in Democracies
AEI Economics Working Paper No. 2018-06
Johns Hopkins Carey Business School Research Paper No. 18-09
35 Pages Posted: 25 May 2018 Last revised: 23 Jul 2018
Date Written: June 6, 2018
Abstract
Economic volatility varies substantially across democracies. We study how the difference between federal and unitary systems of government can contribute to these variations. We show empirically that a higher degree of federalism is associated with less volatility in both economic growth and fiscal policy. Motivated by these stylized facts, we develop a macroeconomic model of policy-making at the central and district levels. Policy at the central level is uncertain due to uncertainty about the identity of the winning coalition in a legislature of district representatives, while policy at the district level is more stable due to homogeneity within districts. We show that, in equilibrium, the decentralization of policy-making powers can mitigate overall policy uncertainty. This implies less volatility in fiscal policy and, hence, less volatility in economic growth, compared to those in a more unitary system.
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