Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk

Posted: 25 May 2018

See all articles by Sylvain Chassang

Sylvain Chassang

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics

Gerard Padró i Miquel

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: November 1, 2010

Abstract

We examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence when fear is a motive for conflict.We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting with those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have different information about their environment. These two strategic settings allow us to identify and distinguish the role of predatory and preemptive incentives as determinants of cooperation and conflict. In our model, weapons unambiguously facilitate peace under complete information. In contrast, under strategic risk, we show that increases in weapon stocks can have a nonmonotonic effect on the sustainability of cooperation. We also show that under strategic risk, asymmetry in military strength can facilitate peace, and that anticipated peacekeeping interventions may improve incentives for peaceful behavior.

Suggested Citation

Chassang, Sylvain and Padro i Miquel, Gerard, Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk (November 1, 2010). Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 125, No. 4, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3179207

Sylvain Chassang (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )

19 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States

Gerard Padro i Miquel

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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