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Incentive-Compatible Contracts and the 'Efficiency Cost' of Sharīʿah-Compliance

Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics, Vol. 30, No. 1, January 2017

4 Pages Posted: 21 May 2018

See all articles by Daniel Hardy

Daniel Hardy

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Geography and Environment

Date Written: January 1, 2017

Abstract

This paper discusses the “efficiency cost” of Shariah-compliance in the perspective of allocation of resources in an Islamic zero-interest-rate economy.

Suggested Citation

Hardy, Daniel, Incentive-Compatible Contracts and the 'Efficiency Cost' of Sharīʿah-Compliance (January 1, 2017). Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics, Vol. 30, No. 1, January 2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3179376

Daniel Hardy (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Geography and Environment ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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