A Two-Party System Under the Proportional Rule is Possible: Strategic Voting in the Lab

36 Pages Posted: 17 May 2018 Last revised: 13 Apr 2019

See all articles by Francesco De Sinopoli

Francesco De Sinopoli

University of Verona - Department of Economics

Giovanna Iannantuoni

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics; Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS)

Valeria Maggian

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia

Stefania Ottone

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS)

Date Written: May 16, 2018

Abstract

In this study, we implement a series of voting games in the laboratory to test whether a strategic voting behavior in a proportional system would arise and induce a two-party system. In each voting game, a finite number of subjects with single-peaked preferences, uniformly distributed on a 0–20 line, are asked to vote for a number within the interval 0–20. The policy outcome is the average of the chosen numbers—a realistic representation of a compromise between parties in a parliament elected through the proportional rule. Our main result shows that polarization and strategic voting occur in the proposed proportional rule scenario. Moreover, experience and information concerning the electoral outcome of the previous period drive individuals to opt for strategic voting.

Keywords: Proportional representation, strategic voting, polarization, political compromise, laboratory experiment, information

JEL Classification: C91, C92, D72

Suggested Citation

De Sinopoli, Francesco and Iannantuoni, Giovanna and Maggian, Valeria and Ottone, Stefania, A Two-Party System Under the Proportional Rule is Possible: Strategic Voting in the Lab (May 16, 2018). University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper No. 381, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3179758 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3179758

Francesco De Sinopoli

University of Verona - Department of Economics ( email )

Via dell'Artigliere, 8
37129 Verona
Italy

Giovanna Iannantuoni (Contact Author)

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics ( email )

Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, 28903
Spain

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, 20126
Italy

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

Valeria Maggian

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy
+39 041 234 9150 (Phone)

Stefania Ottone

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, 20126
Italy

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
19
Abstract Views
351
PlumX Metrics