Employee Compensation Still Impacts Payout Policy

54 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2018 Last revised: 30 Sep 2020

See all articles by Alice A. Bonaime

Alice A. Bonaime

University of Arizona

Kathleen M. Kahle

University of Arizona - Department of Finance

David Moore

Loyola Marymount University

Alok Nemani

Bentley University

Date Written: July 31, 2020

Abstract

Employee compensation may impact payout policy by (i) incentivizing managers with non-dividend-protected options to favor repurchases over dividends and (ii) diluting earnings, which firms can neutralize through share repurchases. Both the dividend-protection and dilution channels imply a positive relation between stock options and repurchases. Yet, recent studies and trends suggest repurchases do not decline when option usage falls around mandatory option expensing, casting doubt upon a causal relation between equity compensation and payout. We examine this relation in light of the shift from options to restricted stock. Our results strongly support a positive relation between compensation and share repurchases via the dilution channel; dividend protection has no first-order effect on payout. Difference-in-differences analyses using a shock to compensation around mandatory option expensing and an instrumental variable approach suggest that the relation between dilution and payout is likely causal. Further, as the dilution channel predicts, equity compensation positively relates to repurchase frequency and timing.

Keywords: Share Repurchases, Dividends, Payout Policy, Stock Options, Restricted Stock, Employee Compensation, Earnings Dilution

JEL Classification: G30, G32, G35

Suggested Citation

Bonaime, Alice A. and Kahle, Kathleen M. and Moore, David and Nemani, Alok, Employee Compensation Still Impacts Payout Policy (July 31, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3180292 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3180292

Alice A. Bonaime (Contact Author)

University of Arizona ( email )

Eller College of Management
Department of Finance
Tucson, AZ 85721
United States

Kathleen M. Kahle

University of Arizona - Department of Finance ( email )

McClelland Hall
P.O. Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
520-621-7489 (Phone)

David Moore

Loyola Marymount University ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90045
United States

Alok Nemani

Bentley University ( email )

175 Forest ST
Apartment 216
Waltham, MA 02452
United States

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