Lobbying Legislatures

Posted: 6 Oct 2002

See all articles by Morten Bennedsen

Morten Bennedsen

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Sven E. Feldmann

Melbourne Business School

Abstract

We analyze informational lobbying in the context of a multimember legislature that decides on the allocation of a public good. First, we observe that a majoritarian legislature provides widely different incentives for interest groups to lobby than a single decision maker does. Second, we compare a decentralized legislature, such as the U.S. Congress, to a parliament with strong party cohesion. Congress's decentralized nature allows the strategic formation of policy coalitions among high-demand districts and the exclusion of low-demand districts. This increases the incentive to provide information about districts' demand relative to a legislature in which the governing coalition is fixed.

Suggested Citation

Bennedsen, Morten and Feldmann, Sven E., Lobbying Legislatures. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 110, August 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=318200

Morten Bennedsen

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Ă˜ster Farimagsgade 5, Bygn 26
Copenhagen, 1353
Denmark

Sven E. Feldmann (Contact Author)

Melbourne Business School ( email )

200 Leicester Street
Carlton, Victoria 3053 3186
Australia
+61 3 9349 8171 (Phone)
+61 3 9349 8144 (Fax)

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