The Carbon Abatement Game

49 Pages Posted: 25 May 2018

See all articles by Christoph Hambel

Christoph Hambel

Goethe University Frankfurt

Holger Kraft

Goethe University Frankfurt

Eduardo S. Schwartz

Simon Fraser University (SFU); University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: May 2018

Abstract

Climate change is one of the major global challenges. Mitigating its impact is however bedeviled by free-rider problems and external effects. We thus study the problem of optimal carbon abatement in a dynamic non-cooperative game-theoretical setting involving multiple countries that are open economies. Our framework involves stochastic dynamics for CO2 emissions and economic output of the countries. Each country is represented by a recursive-preference functional. Despite its complexity, the model is analytically tractable. We can explicitly quantify each country's decision on consumption, investment, and abatement expenditures. We also derive closed-form solutions for the country-specific and global social cost of carbon (SCC). One key finding is that both versions of the SCC are increasing in trade volume. This result is robust to adding capital transfers between countries. Our numerical examples suggest that disregarding trade might lead to a significant underestimation of the SCC.

Suggested Citation

Hambel, Christoph and Kraft, Holger and Schwartz, Eduardo S., The Carbon Abatement Game (May 2018). NBER Working Paper No. w24604, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182205

Christoph Hambel (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Business
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Holger Kraft

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Business
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Eduardo S. Schwartz

Simon Fraser University (SFU) ( email )

8888 University Drive
Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6
Canada

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-1953 (Phone)
310-206-5455 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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