Who is Cheating? The Role of Attendants, Risk Aversion, and Affluence

40 Pages Posted: 25 May 2018

See all articles by Olaf Hübler

Olaf Hübler

University of Hannover; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Lukas Menkhoff

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin); Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics

Ulrich Schmidt

University of Kiel - Institute of Economics

Date Written: May 1, 2018

Abstract

This research integrates a standard “cheating” experiment into a broad household survey and finds relationships between individual characteristics and cheating behavior. We allow for attendance of others at the cheating experiment, addressing the “reputation to be seen as honest,” finding there is indeed less cheating with attendants. Regarding the preference for “honesty,” we find two related attitudes: stronger risk aversion increases the costs of cheating, i.e. behaving against the norm, while affluence makes cheating costly, as it allows behaving honestly. The underlying experiment in rural Thailand reproduces stylized facts of the cheating literature.

Keywords: Cheating, individual characteristics, risk attitude

JEL Classification: D01, D81, D82

Suggested Citation

Hübler, Olaf and Menkhoff, Lukas and Schmidt, Ulrich, Who is Cheating? The Role of Attendants, Risk Aversion, and Affluence (May 1, 2018). DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No. 1736. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3183699 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3183699

Olaf Hübler

University of Hannover ( email )

Institute of Quantitative Economic Research
D-30167 Hannover
Germany
+49 511 762 4794 (Phone)
+49 511 762 3923 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Lukas Menkhoff (Contact Author)

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Spandauer Strasse 1
Berlin
Germany

Ulrich Schmidt

University of Kiel - Institute of Economics ( email )

Olshausenstrasse 40
24098 Kiel, 24098
Germany

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