Full Information Equivalence in Large Elections

40 Pages Posted: 6 Jun 2018 Last revised: 30 Jun 2020

See all articles by Paulo Barelli

Paulo Barelli

University of Rochester - Department of Economics

Sourav Bhattacharya

University of London - Royal Holloway College

Lucas Siga

New York University (NYU) - Abu Dhabi

Date Written: February 4, 2019

Abstract

We study the problem of aggregating private information in elections with two or more alternatives. We characterize environments where information can be aggregated asymptotically by a sequence of equilibria of voting games as the electorate grows large and explore the implications for the information structure. Information aggregation is generically possible when the signal space is rich relative to the state space, and fails robustly when the state space is rich relative to the signal space. We focus on plurality rule, but our results extend to supermajority rules and a large family of scoring rules which includes the approval rule.

Keywords: Information Aggregation, Large Elections

JEL Classification: C71, D72, D80

Suggested Citation

Barelli, Paulo and Bhattacharya, Sourav and Siga, Lucas, Full Information Equivalence in Large Elections (February 4, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3183959 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3183959

Paulo Barelli (Contact Author)

University of Rochester - Department of Economics ( email )

Harkness Hall
Rochester, NY 14627
United States
(585) 275-8075 (Phone)

Sourav Bhattacharya

University of London - Royal Holloway College ( email )

Egham
Surrey
TW20 0EX
United Kingdom

Lucas Siga

New York University (NYU) - Abu Dhabi ( email )

PO Box 129188
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates

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