Compliance in Teams - Implications of Joint Decisions and Shared Consequences
36 Pages Posted: 24 May 2018 Last revised: 27 Feb 2019
Date Written: May 24, 2018
This paper investigates the compliance behavior of teams. We address two questions: First, are teams more or less compliant than individuals? Second, are differences in compliance behavior due to team decision-making per se or due to the shared economic consequences among team members? Our experimental setting consists of a repeated income reporting task. High incomes are subject to a deduction while low incomes are exempt. Thus, subjects with a high income have a monetary incentive to non-comply. This comes at the cost of a fine if they are caught lying during the course of an audit. Treatments separate the decision-making dimension from the liability dimension. We find evidence that teams are substantially less compliant than individuals are. This drop in compliance is driven by the joint (rather than individual) liability of team members. In contrast, whether subjects make their decisions alone or as team does not influence the compliance behavior. Team decision-making is characterized by a high rate of mutual agreement among team members. Interestingly, when deciding together and being liable jointly, team members' declarations are highly correlated. Evaluating their chat protocols shows that the risk dimension of the compliance task, the monetary consequences of the report and the concept of being honest are important motivation for (non-)compliance. Our findings have implications for the design of both governance rules and enforcement policies.
Keywords: Compliance, lying, group decision, joint liability, audit, communication, laboratory experiment
JEL Classification: C92, D91, K42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation