Dynamics of the Market for Corporate Tax-Avoidance Advice

35 Pages Posted: 24 May 2018

See all articles by Kai A. Konrad

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: May 24, 2018

Abstract

This paper addresses the current debate about mandatory disclosure rules for aggressive tax-planning models as a means to shorten regulatory delay. It focuses on the dynamic interaction of innovation and imitation of aggressive tax-planning products and governmental tax regulation and highlights the importance of the length of regulatory lag in comparison to the time it takes the tax-consulting industry to imitate newly innovated tax-avoidance products. It reveals synergies between highly innovative tax-consulting firms and the governmental tax legislator/regulator. It suggests that innovative tax-consulting firms may benefit from governmental regulation and may actively try to inform and influence the regulator to shorten but not eliminate the regulatory delay.

Keywords: corporate taxation, tax planning, mandatory disclosure rules, tax consultants, innovation, imitation, tax avoidance, anti-tax- avoidance regulation

JEL Classification: H26, M48

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A., Dynamics of the Market for Corporate Tax-Avoidance Advice (May 24, 2018). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-4, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3184246 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3184246

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

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Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

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Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Bonn, 53072
Germany

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