Time Pressure and Honesty in a Deception Game

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Forthcoming

14 Pages Posted: 17 Jun 2018 Last revised: 23 Jan 2019

See all articles by Valerio Capraro

Valerio Capraro

Middlesex University

Jonathan Schulz

Harvard University

David G. Rand

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Date Written: January 21, 2019

Abstract

Previous experiments have found mixed results on whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation. Here we add to this literature by building on prior work of Capraro (2017). We report a large study (N=1,389) manipulating time pressure vs time delay in a deception game. We find that, in this setting, people are more honest under time pressure, and that this result is not driven by confounds present in earlier work.

Keywords: honesty, deception, intuition, deliberation, sender-receiver

JEL Classification: C70, C79, C90, C91, C92, D64, D70, D71, H41

Suggested Citation

Capraro, Valerio and Schulz, Jonathan and Rand, David G., Time Pressure and Honesty in a Deception Game (January 21, 2019). Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3184537 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3184537

Valerio Capraro (Contact Author)

Middlesex University ( email )

The Burroughs
London, NW4 4BT
United Kingdom

Jonathan Schulz

Harvard University ( email )

1875 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

David G. Rand

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.daverand.org

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