ETF Ownership and Corporate Investment

57 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2018 Last revised: 8 Nov 2018

See all articles by Constantinos Antoniou

Constantinos Antoniou

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School

Avanidhar Subrahmanyam

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area; Institute of Global Finance, UNSW Business School; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Onur Tosun

University of Warwick - Finance Group

Date Written: November 6, 2018

Abstract

We examine whether ownership by exchange traded funds (ETFs) affects the relation between real investment and Tobin’s Q. Recent studies show that the stock prices of companies included in ETF baskets are more noisy; due to this effect, the managers of firms highly-owned by ETFs should rely less stock prices for information, which, in turn, should weaken the investment-Q relation for such firms. The results reliably confirm the hypothesis. To address endogeneity, we estimate an instrumental variable model based on S&P500 index additions, and find that the results continue to hold. The sensitivity of dividends to prices is higher for firms that are heavily ETF-owned, which suggests that managers pay money out to shareholders foregoing growth opportunities. Operating performance is less sensitive to stock prices for higher ETF-owned firms, which suggests that the effect of ETF ownership on the sensitivity of corporate policies to stock prices is to make the link between stock price and future performance more tenuous..

Keywords: ETF Ownership, Corporate Investment

JEL Classification: G10, G30

Suggested Citation

Antoniou, Constantinos and Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar and Tosun, Onur Kemal, ETF Ownership and Corporate Investment (November 6, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3184949 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3184949

Constantinos Antoniou

University of Warwick - Warwick Business School ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

Avanidhar Subrahmanyam (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Finance Area ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States
310-825-5355 (Phone)
310-206-5455 (Fax)

Institute of Global Finance, UNSW Business School

Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

Financial Research Network (FIRN)

C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia

Onur Kemal Tosun

University of Warwick - Finance Group ( email )

Gibbet Hill Rd
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
+44(0)2476524541 (Phone)

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