The Impact of Exchange Listing on Corporate Governance: Evidence from Direct Listings

58 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2018 Last revised: 27 Sep 2018

See all articles by Dan W. French

Dan W. French

University of Missouri at Columbia

Andrew E. Kern

University of Missouri - Trulaske College of Business

Thibaut G. Morillon

University of Missouri at Columbia

Adam S. Yore

University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Finance

Date Written: September 14, 2018

Abstract

Spotify Technology disrupted the traditional IPO marketplace by avoiding investment bankers and directly listing its existing shares on the NYSE. We use similar transactions by public non-listed REITs to study direct exchange listing for companies with existing publicly owned, but non-listed shares in a setting where the effects of listing are distinct from the confounding effect of capital raising inherent in traditional IPOs. Our evidence shows corporate governance improves during and following listing and suggests that incentives for rent extraction by management are a prime motivation when choosing not to list.

Keywords: Direct Listing, Exchange Listing, Corporate Governance, Spotify, REITs

JEL Classification: G23, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

French, Dan W. and Kern, Andrew E. and Morillon, Thibaut and Yore, Adam S., The Impact of Exchange Listing on Corporate Governance: Evidence from Direct Listings (September 14, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3185065 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3185065

Dan W. French

University of Missouri at Columbia ( email )

Columbia, MO Columbia 65211
United States

Andrew E. Kern

University of Missouri - Trulaske College of Business ( email )

403 Cornell Hall
Columbia, MO 65211
United States

Thibaut Morillon

University of Missouri at Columbia ( email )

332 Cornell Hall
Columbia, MO Columbia 65211
United States

Adam S. Yore (Contact Author)

University of Missouri at Columbia - Department of Finance ( email )

403 Cornell Hall
Columbia, MO 65211
United States
573-884-1446 (Phone)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
122
rank
223,744
Abstract Views
877
PlumX Metrics