First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction

11 Pages Posted: 7 Jun 2018

See all articles by Dirk Bergemann

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Benjamin A. Brooks

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Stephen Morris

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 21, 2018

Abstract

In a recent paper, [Bergemann et al. 2017a], we derive results about equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction that hold across all common-prior information structures. The purpose of this letter is to give an informal introduction into the results. At the end we offer a brief discussion of related work.

Keywords: First-price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, Surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Brooks, Benjamin A. and Morris, Stephen Edward, First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction (May 21, 2018). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2132. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3186516 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3186516

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3592 (Phone)
203-432-2128 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Benjamin A. Brooks

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Stephen Edward Morris

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
49
Abstract Views
189
PlumX Metrics