Skill Development, Bargaining Power, and a Theory of Job Design

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Forthcoming

43 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2018

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 11, 2018

Abstract

We examine the job design decision in the context of skill development and bargaining power. The choice between specialization and multitasking requires employees to develop either specialized or varied task-specifc skills. Employees (i.e., the owners of the acquired skills) bargaining power depends on their skill sets which differentiate their ability to hold up production and threaten to leave a firm. When a firm cannot meaningfully elicit skill investments through job design, it will pursue inefficient multitasking to reduce production holdups or inefficient specialization to prevent skilled employees from leaving. We obtain inefficient job design results only for mediocre ability workers.

Keywords: Specialization Versus Multitasking; Skill Development; Bargaining Power; Inefficient Job Design

JEL Classification: D23; J24; M54

Suggested Citation

Moon, Seongwuk, Skill Development, Bargaining Power, and a Theory of Job Design (April 11, 2018). Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3186555

Seongwuk Moon (Contact Author)

Sogang University ( email )

Seoul 121-742
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
16
Abstract Views
178
PlumX Metrics