Inside and Outside Perspectives on Legitimacy: The Implications of Incentive-Incompatibility

20 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2018  

Cameron Harwick

The College at Brockport SUNY

Date Written: May 30, 2018

Abstract

This paper discusses the implications of the impossibility of totally incentive-compatible social behavior, whether organizationally or politically. Specifically, drawing on the theory of cooperation, the paper argues for the existence of irreducible and irreconcilable “inside” and “outside” perspectives on social institutions; that is, between foundationalist and functionalist approaches, both of which have a long pedigree in political economy. The conflict between the two, and the practical impossibility of dispensing with either, poses a challenge for an ethical institutional economics.

Keywords: Game Theory, Cooperation, Institutions

JEL Classification: C73, A13

Suggested Citation

Harwick, Cameron, Inside and Outside Perspectives on Legitimacy: The Implications of Incentive-Incompatibility (May 30, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3187581 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3187581

Cameron Harwick (Contact Author)

The College at Brockport SUNY ( email )

Brockport, NY 14420
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://cameronharwick.com

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