The Regulatory and Monetary Policy Nexus in the Repo Market
53 Pages Posted: 6 Jun 2018 Last revised: 29 Apr 2020
Date Written: April, 2018
We examine the interaction of regulatory reforms and changes in monetary policy in the U.S. repo market. Using a proprietary data set of repo transactions, we find that differences in regional implementation of Basel III capital reforms intensified European dealers' window-dressing by 80%. Money funds eligible to use the Fed's reverse repo (RRP) facility cut their private lending almost by half and instead lent to the Fed when European dealers withdraw, contributing to smooth implementation of Basel III. In a difference-in-differences setting, we show that ineligible funds lent 15% less to European dealers as they find their withdrawal for reporting purposes inconvenient. We find that intermediation through the RRP led to quantity and not pricing adjustments in the market, which is consistent with the RRP facility anchoring market rates.
JEL Classification: C32, E43, E52
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation