Strategic Power Revisited

31 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2002

See all articles by Stefan Napel

Stefan Napel

University of Hamburg - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Mika Widgren

University of Turku - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: May 2002

Abstract

Traditional power indices ignore preferences and strategic interaction. Equilibrium analysis of particular non-cooperative decision procedures is unsuitable for normative analysis and assumes typically unavailable information. These points drive a lingering debate about the right approach to power analysis. A unified framework that works both sides of the street is developed here. It rests on a notion of a posteriori power which formalizes players' marginal impact to outcomes in cooperative and non-cooperative games, for strategic interaction and purely random behaviour. Taking expectations with respect to preferences, actions, and procedures then defines a meaningful a priori measure. Established indices turn out to be special cases.

Keywords: Power Indices, Spatial Voting, Equilibrium Analysis, Decision Procedures

JEL Classification: C70, D70, D72

Suggested Citation

Napel, Stefan and Widgren, Mika T., Strategic Power Revisited (May 2002). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 736. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=318775

Stefan Napel

University of Hamburg - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Von-Melle-Park 5
Hamburg, 20146
Germany

Mika T. Widgren (Contact Author)

University of Turku - Department of Economics ( email )

FIN-20500 Turku
Finland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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