Strategic Power Revisited
31 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2002
Date Written: May 2002
Abstract
Traditional power indices ignore preferences and strategic interaction. Equilibrium analysis of particular non-cooperative decision procedures is unsuitable for normative analysis and assumes typically unavailable information. These points drive a lingering debate about the right approach to power analysis. A unified framework that works both sides of the street is developed here. It rests on a notion of a posteriori power which formalizes players' marginal impact to outcomes in cooperative and non-cooperative games, for strategic interaction and purely random behaviour. Taking expectations with respect to preferences, actions, and procedures then defines a meaningful a priori measure. Established indices turn out to be special cases.
Keywords: Power Indices, Spatial Voting, Equilibrium Analysis, Decision Procedures
JEL Classification: C70, D70, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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