Alliance Formation in a Side-Taking Experiment

Journal of Experimental Political Science. 2019. 6(1): 53-70.

36 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2018 Last revised: 9 Jan 2020

See all articles by Peter DeScioli

Peter DeScioli

Chapman University Economic Science Institute

Erik O. Kimbrough

Chapman University - The George L. Argyros School of Business & Economics

Date Written: May 31, 2018

Abstract

We investigate in an economic experiment how people choose sides in disputes. In an eight-player side-taking game, two disputants at a time fight over an indivisible resource and other group members choose sides. The player with more supporters wins the resource, which is worth real money. Conflicts occur spontaneously between any two individuals in the group. Players choose sides by ranking their loyalties to everyone else in the group and they automatically support the disputant they ranked higher. We manipulate participants’ information about other players’ loyalties and also their ability to communicate with public chat messages. We find that participants spontaneously and quickly formed alliances, and more information about loyalties caused more alliance-building. Without communication, we observe little evidence of bandwagon or egalitarian strategies, but with communication, some groups invented rank rotation schemes to equalize payoffs while choosing the same side to avoid fighting costs.

Keywords: alliances, bandwagon, egalitarian, conflict, experimental economics

JEL Classification: C91, D91, D72

Suggested Citation

DeScioli, Peter and Kimbrough, Erik O., Alliance Formation in a Side-Taking Experiment (May 31, 2018). Journal of Experimental Political Science. 2019. 6(1): 53-70., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3188247 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3188247

Peter DeScioli

Chapman University Economic Science Institute ( email )

One University Dr.
Orange, CA 92866
United States

Erik O. Kimbrough (Contact Author)

Chapman University - The George L. Argyros School of Business & Economics ( email )

One University Dr
Orange, CA 92866
United States

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