Gordon Tullock Meets Phineas Gage: The Political Economy of Lobotomies in the United States

13 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2018 Last revised: 15 Nov 2018

See all articles by Raymond March

Raymond March

Texas Tech University - Free Market Institute; Angelo State University

Vincent Geloso

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 6, 2018

Abstract

In the late 1940s, the United States experienced a “lobotomy boom” where the use of the lobotomy expanded exponentially. We engage in a comparative institutional analysis, following the framework developed by Tullock (2005), to explain why the lobotomy gained popularity and widespread use despite widespread scientific consensus it was ineffective. We argue that government provision and funding for public mental hospitals and asylums expanded and prolonged the use of the lobotomy. We support this claim by noting the lobotomy had virtually disappeared from private mental hospitals and asylums before the boom and was less used beforehand. This paper provides a more robust explanation for the lobotomy boom in the US and expands on the literate examining the relationship between state funding and scientific inquiry.

Keywords: lobotomies, economics of science, public choice, political economy, mental health

Suggested Citation

March, Raymond and Geloso, Vincent, Gordon Tullock Meets Phineas Gage: The Political Economy of Lobotomies in the United States (June 6, 2018). NDSU Public Choice and Private Enterprise Research Paper No. 18-2, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3188326 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3188326

Raymond March (Contact Author)

Texas Tech University - Free Market Institute ( email )

Box 45059
Lubbock, TX 79409-5059
United States

Angelo State University ( email )

2601 W. Avenue N
San Angelo, TX 76909
United States

Vincent Geloso

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

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