Dynamic Adverse Selection and Liquidity

40 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2018 Last revised: 12 Jan 2024

See all articles by Ioanid Rosu

Ioanid Rosu

HEC Paris - Finance Department

Date Written: June 24, 2022

Abstract

Does a larger fraction of informed trading generate more illiquidity, as measured by the bid-ask spread? We answer this question in the negative in the context of a dynamic dealer market where the fundamental value follows a random walk, provided we consider the long run (stationary) equilibrium. More informed traders tend to generate more adverse selection and hence larger spreads, but at the same time cause faster learning by the market makers and hence smaller spreads. These two effects offset each other in the long run. In a more general setup with public news, the offsetting result depends on the persistence of news.

Keywords: Learning, adverse selection, dynamic model, stationary distribution

JEL Classification: G14, D82

Suggested Citation

Rosu, Ioanid, Dynamic Adverse Selection and Liquidity (June 24, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3190206 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3190206

Ioanid Rosu (Contact Author)

HEC Paris - Finance Department ( email )

1 rue de la Liberation
Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France

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