Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators? (Presentation Slides)

31 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2018

See all articles by David Hirshleifer

David Hirshleifer

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Angie Low

Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University

Siew Hong Teoh

UCLA Anderson School of Management

Date Written: June 5, 2018

Abstract

This is the set of presentation slides for the paper "Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?"

Previous empirical work on adverse consequences of CEO overconfidence raises the question of why firms hire overconfident managers. Theoretical research suggests a reason: overconfidence can benefit shareholders by increasing investment in risky projects. Using options- and press-based proxies for CEO overconfidence, we find that over the 1993–2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research and development expenditures. However, overconfident managers achieve greater innovation only in innovative industries. Our findings suggest that overconfidence helps CEOs exploit innovative growth opportunities.

Link to original paper https://ssrn.com/abstract=1598021.

Keywords: CEO Overconfidence, Innovation, R&D, Patent

JEL Classification: M41

Suggested Citation

Hirshleifer, David and Low, Angie and Teoh, Siew Hong, Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators? (Presentation Slides) (June 5, 2018). Journal of Finance (2012), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3190958

David Hirshleifer

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department ( email )

Marshall School of Business
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.uci.edu/dhirshle/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Angie Low (Contact Author)

Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University ( email )

Singapore, 639798
Singapore

Siew Hong Teoh

UCLA Anderson School of Management ( email )

110 Westwood Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1481
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty-and-research/accounting/faculty/teoh

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