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Ownership and Trade from Evolutionary Games

Kenton K. Yee

Mellon Capital Management

July 15, 2002

Two new evolutionary game models are presented where ownership and trade emerge from anarchy as evolutionary stable strategies. In these models, ownership status provides an endogenous asymmetrizing criterion enabling cheaper resolution of property conflicts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: Property, trade, evolutionary games, ownership, game theory, sociobiology, property rights

JEL Classification: K0, C7, C73, K1, K2, D7, L0, Z1, E11

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Date posted: August 5, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Yee, Kenton K., Ownership and Trade from Evolutionary Games (July 15, 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=319102 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.319102

Contact Information

Kenton K. Yee (Contact Author)
Mellon Capital Management ( email )
50 Fremont Street, #3819
San Francisco, CA 94105
United States
415-975-3565 (Phone)
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