Public-Sector Unions and Government Policy: The Effects of Political Contributions and Collective Bargaining Rights

31 Pages Posted: 7 Jun 2018

See all articles by George R. Crowley

George R. Crowley

Troy University - Manuel H. Johnson Center for Political Economy

Scott Beaulier

North Dakota State University

Date Written: 11/18/2014

Abstract

Recent events, including the failed recall of Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker and the Chicago teachers strike, have shed light on the relationship between state fiscal policy and public-sector union power. While a literature has developed focusing on various aspects of the link between public-sector unions and government policy, scholars have yet to reach consensus. In most cases, public-sector unions have multiple tools they can use to influence policy. To the extent that different tools function as substitutes, their relative importance may be weakened due to diminishing returns. If, instead, they serve as complements, they may only be effective when used in concert. Furthermore, their effectiveness may be affected by the government's support of union interests. We find that union political contributions and collective bargaining are associated with higher incomes for state and local employees and with higher public employment, both across state and local government overall as well as within the education sector. We also find little to no evidence that union activity influences total spending.

Suggested Citation

Crowley, George R. and Beaulier, Scott, Public-Sector Unions and Government Policy: The Effects of Political Contributions and Collective Bargaining Rights (11/18/2014). MERCATUS WORKING PAPER, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3191362 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3191362

George R. Crowley (Contact Author)

Troy University - Manuel H. Johnson Center for Political Economy ( email )

Bibb Graves Hall
Troy, AL 36082
United States

Scott Beaulier

North Dakota State University

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