Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law

112 American Journal of International Law 361 (2018); https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2018.70

Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 18-22

UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2018-50

51 Pages Posted: 8 Jun 2018 Last revised: 31 Aug 2018

Sergio Puig

University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law

Gregory Shaffer

University of California, Irvine School of Law

Date Written: August 31, 2018

Abstract

This Article applies the theory of comparative institutional analysis to evaluate the trade-offs associated with alternative institutional mechanisms for resolving investment disputes. We assess the trade-offs in light of the principle of accountability under the rule of law, which underpins the goals of fairness, efficiency, and peace that are attributed to investment law. The Article makes two recommendations: first, reforms should address complementarity between domestic and international institutions; second, institutional choice shouldrespond to the different contexts that states face.

Keywords: investment disputes, accountability, investor-state dispute settlement, ISDS, international investment law

Suggested Citation

Puig, Sergio and Shaffer, Gregory C., Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law (August 31, 2018). 112 American Journal of International Law 361 (2018); https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2018.70; Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 18-22; UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2018-50. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3191639

Sergio Puig (Contact Author)

University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 210176
Tucson, AZ 85721-0176
United States

Gregory C. Shaffer

University of California, Irvine School of Law ( email )

401 E. Peltason Dr.
Ste. 1000
Irvine, CA 92612
United States

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