Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law

American Journal of International Law, (2018 Forthcoming)

Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 18-22

50 Pages Posted: 8 Jun 2018  

Sergio Puig

University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law

Gregory Shaffer

University of California, Irvine School of Law

Date Written: June 14, 2018

Abstract

This Article applies the theory of comparative institutional analysis to evaluate the trade-offs associated with alternative institutional processes for resolving investment disputes in terms of their relative biases. We assess the trade-offs in light of the principle of accountability under the rule of law, which underpins other goals attributed to investment law. The Article makes two recommendations: first, reforms should address complementarity between domestic and international institutions; second, institutional choice should vary in light of the different contexts that States face.

Keywords: investment disputes, accountability, investor-state dispute settlement, ISDS, international investment law,

Suggested Citation

Puig, Sergio and Shaffer, Gregory, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law (June 14, 2018). American Journal of International Law, (2018 Forthcoming); Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 18-22. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3191639

Sergio Puig (Contact Author)

University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 210176
Tucson, AZ 85721-0176
United States

Gregory C. Shaffer

University of California, Irvine School of Law ( email )

401 E. Peltason Dr.
Ste. 1000
Irvine, CA 92612
United States

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