Antitrust Scrutiny of Excessive Prices in the Pharmaceutical Sector: A Comparative Study of the Italian and UK Experiences

20 Pages Posted: 22 Jun 2018 Last revised: 23 Sep 2018

See all articles by Margherita Colangelo

Margherita Colangelo

Roma Tre University - Department of Law

Claudia Desogus

University of Bologna

Date Written: April 8, 2018

Abstract

Excessive pricing has generally been seen as a problem to be addressed through sector-specific regulation rather than through antitrust intervention. Literature on the issue is divided between scholars calling for an interventionist approach and those supporting a non-interventionist approach on the basis of conflicting rationales. However, recent cases have called attention to the imposition of excessive prices in the pharmaceutical sector. The Aspen and the Flynn cases, in particular, constitute emblematic examples of such practice in the field of off-patent drugs. The analysis of the investigations conducted by national competition authorities in these cases provides some important insights into the controversial issues of ascertaining when antitrust intervention can be considered justified and of determining which methodology may be properly adopted in order to assess whether a drug price is unfairly high.

Keywords: excessive pricing; pharmaceutical sector; off-patent drugs

JEL Classification: K21; L4

Suggested Citation

Colangelo, Margherita and Desogus, Claudia, Antitrust Scrutiny of Excessive Prices in the Pharmaceutical Sector: A Comparative Study of the Italian and UK Experiences (April 8, 2018). World Competition: Law and Economics Review, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3192334

Margherita Colangelo (Contact Author)

Roma Tre University - Department of Law ( email )

Via Ostiense, 159
Rome, 00154
Italy

Claudia Desogus

University of Bologna ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, 40126
Italy

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