Dismantling of a Breakthrough: The Kyoto Protocol - Just Symbolic Policy!

18 Pages Posted: 8 Aug 2002

See all articles by Christoph Böhringer

Christoph Böhringer

University of Oldenburg - Economic Policy; Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Carsten Vogt

Zentrum fuer EuropSische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW Centre for European Economic Research), Environmental & Resource Economics

Date Written: May 15, 2002

Abstract

We show that U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is straightforward under political economy considerations. The reason is that U.S. compliance costs exceed low willingness to pay for dealing with global warming in the U.S. The withdrawal had a crucial impact on the concretion of the Protocol prior to its likely ratification at the end of 2002. Remaining non-EU Parties to the Kyoto Protocol gained veto bargaining power and, thus, were successful in asserting far reaching concessions from the EU on sink credits and tradability of emission rights. Taking these concessions into account, the Kyoto Protocol was essentially reduced to a symbolic treaty that codifies more or less business-as-usual emissions and makes compliance a rather cheap deal.

Keywords: climate policy, political economy, willingness to pay

JEL Classification: D58, H40, Q43

Suggested Citation

Bohringer, Christoph and Vogt, Carsten, Dismantling of a Breakthrough: The Kyoto Protocol - Just Symbolic Policy! (May 15, 2002). ZEW Discussion Paper No. 02-25, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=319329 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.319329

Christoph Bohringer (Contact Author)

University of Oldenburg - Economic Policy ( email )

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

D-68161 Mannheim
Germany
+49 6211235200 (Phone)
+49 6211235226 (Fax)

Carsten Vogt

Zentrum fuer EuropSische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW Centre for European Economic Research), Environmental & Resource Economics ( email )

Eco-management
D-68161 Mannheim
Germany
+49 6211235200 (Phone)
+49 6211235226 (Fax)

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