Per Unit vs. Ad Valorem Royalty Licensing

8 Pages Posted: 22 Jun 2018 Last revised: 8 Nov 2022

See all articles by Cuihong Fan

Cuihong Fan

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Byoung Jun

Korea University

Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics; Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: June 9, 2018

Abstract

We consider licensing of non-drastic innovations by a patent holder who interacts with a potential licensee in a downstream market. We compare two kinds of license contracts: per unit and ad valorem royalties, combined with fixed fees. Assuming that antitrust authorities apply the same principle to review ad valorem licensing which they apply to per unit licensing, we show that per unit licensing is more profitable if the licensor is more efficient in using the innovation, whereas ad valorem licensing is more profitable if the licensee is more efficient. This explains why and when these licensing schemes should be observed.

Keywords: innovation, patent licensing, royalty contracts

JEL Classification: D21, L13, L24, L41

Suggested Citation

Fan, Cuihong and Jun, Byoung and Wolfstetter, Elmar G., Per Unit vs. Ad Valorem Royalty Licensing (June 9, 2018). Economics Letters, 2018, 170: 71-75, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3193376

Cuihong Fan

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics ( email )

777 Guoding Road
Shanghai, AK Shanghai 200433
China

Byoung Jun

Korea University ( email )

1 Anam-dong 5 ka
Seoul, 136-701
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Elmar G. Wolfstetter (Contact Author)

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I
Spandauer Strasse 1
Berlin
Germany
+49 30 2093 5652/3 (Phone)
+49 30 2093 5619 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/wolfstetter/home

Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce ( email )

Anam-dong, Sungbuk-Ku
Seoul, 136-701
Korea

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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