Competitive Response to Unbundled Services: An Empirical Look at Spirit Airlines

Forthcoming, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

44 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2018 Last revised: 9 Aug 2021

See all articles by Lei He

Lei He

Moravian College

Myongjin Kim

University of Oklahoma

Qihong Liu

University of Oklahoma - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 8, 2021

Abstract

In 2010, Spirit airlines announced that it would start charging passengers for carry-on baggage. Using a vector of route level characteristics, we construct a matched group consisting of routes which best match those served by Spirit (the treated group). We then run a diff-in-diff estimation using the treated and matched group, and examine the impact of Spirit's baggage fee policy on its rivals' ticket prices. Our results show that Spirit's rivals reduce their prices by about 5.8% after Spirit charges carry-on baggage fee. We also look into potentially heterogeneous responses across different types of rivals. There is no significant difference in how low-cost carriers and legacy carriers respond to Spirit's policy change. However, relative to non-subcontracting carriers, those which subcontract operations to regional carriers reduce their prices further by more than 10%, including average prices (linear or log) and various other points on the price distribution. We also develop a stylized theory model to help better understand our empirical findings.

Keywords: Carry-on baggage fee; Unbundling; Add-on pricing; Subcontracting; Low-cost carriers

JEL Classification: D43, L13, L24, L93

Suggested Citation

He, Lei and Kim, Myongjin and Liu, Qihong, Competitive Response to Unbundled Services: An Empirical Look at Spirit Airlines (August 8, 2021). Forthcoming, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3193708 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3193708

Lei He

Moravian College ( email )

1200 Main Street
Bethlehem, PA PA 18018
United States
4057785199 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://leihe.weebly.com/

Myongjin Kim

University of Oklahoma ( email )

307 W Brooks
Norman, OK 73019
United States

Qihong Liu (Contact Author)

University of Oklahoma - Department of Economics ( email )

Norman, OK 73019-2103
United States
405-325-5846 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://qliu.oucreate.com

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