Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma

63 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2018

See all articles by Kenju Kamei

Kenju Kamei

Durham University - Department of Economics and Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 13, 2018

Abstract

Teams are known to behave differently from individuals, but whether they behave more cooperatively or selfishly is still unsettled in the literature. We let subjects form two-person pairs and play a finitely-repeated two-player public goods game with other pairs, and then compare the pairs’ behaviour with the behaviour of individuals in the same game played against individuals. We vary treatments by the matching protocol between decision-making units (partner or stranger matching). Our data show that when the matching is fixed for all periods, pairs are able to sustain cooperation at high levels while individuals steadily decrease contributions from period to period. By sharp contrast, when pairs are randomly matched with other pairs in every period, they quickly decrease contributions over the periods, as is the case for individuals with the stranger matching protocol.

Keywords: experiment, cooperation, dilemma, team work

JEL Classification: C73, C92, D70

Suggested Citation

Kamei, Kenju, Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma (June 13, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3195145 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3195145

Kenju Kamei (Contact Author)

Durham University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Durham, DH1 3HY
United Kingdom

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