Do School Principals Respond to Increased Public Scrutiny? New Survey Evidence from Australia

29 Pages Posted: 14 Jun 2018

See all articles by Michael Bernard Coelli

Michael Bernard Coelli

The University of Melbourne

Gigi Foster

UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics

Andrew Leigh

Australian House of Representatives Parliament House; Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, ANU; IZA

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2018

Abstract

We explore responses of Australian school principals to the introduction of test score reporting via the My School website in 2010. Theory suggests that heightened public scrutiny should motivate principals to adopt best practices for improving their schools' test results. We use responses from both public and private schools to a custom‐built questionnaire administered to principals before (2009) and after (2012) the My School website launch. We find scarce evidence of meaningful adjustments over time, but we do find evidence of significantly different policies and practices across school groups.

Suggested Citation

Coelli, Michael Bernard and Foster, Gigi and Leigh, Andrew, Do School Principals Respond to Increased Public Scrutiny? New Survey Evidence from Australia (June 2018). Economic Record, Vol. 94, pp. 73-101, 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3195511 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-4932.12400

Michael Bernard Coelli (Contact Author)

The University of Melbourne ( email )

Melbourne, 3010
Australia
+61 3 8344 8586 (Phone)
+61 3 8344 6899 (Fax)

Gigi Foster

UNSW Australia Business School, School of Economics ( email )

High Street
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

Andrew Leigh

Australian House of Representatives Parliament House ( email )

Canberra, 2600
Australia

Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, ANU ( email )

ANU College of Business and Economics
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia

IZA ( email )

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
0
Abstract Views
52
PlumX Metrics