The Economic Limits of Bitcoin and the Blockchain

24 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2018

See all articles by Eric B. Budish

Eric B. Budish

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

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Date Written: June 5, 2018

Abstract

The amount of computational power devoted to anonymous, decentralized blockchains such as Bitcoin’s must simultaneously satisfy two conditions in equilibrium: (1) a zero-profit condition among miners, who engage in a rent-seeking competition for the prize associated with adding the next block to the chain; and (2) an incentive compatibility condition on the system’s vulnerability to a “majority attack”, namely that the computational costs of such an attack must exceed the benefits. Together, these two equations imply that (3) the recurring, “flow”, payments to miners for running the blockchain must be large relative to the one-off, “stock”, benefits of attacking it. This is very expensive! The constraint is softer (i.e., stock versus stock) if both (i) the mining technology used to run the blockchain is both scarce and non-repurposable, and (ii) any majority attack is a “sabotage” in that it causes a collapse in the economic value of the blockchain; however, reliance on non-repurposable technology for security and vulnerability to sabotage each raise their own concerns, and point to specific collapse scenarios. In particular, the model suggests that Bitcoin would be majority attacked if it became sufficiently economically important — e.g., if it became a “store of value” akin to gold— which suggests that there are intrinsic economic limits to how economically important it can become in the first place.

Suggested Citation

Budish, Eric B., The Economic Limits of Bitcoin and the Blockchain (June 5, 2018). Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 18-07. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3197300 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3197300

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