Turning the Lab into Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon: A Lab Experiment on the Transparency of Punishment

33 Pages Posted: 18 Jun 2018

See all articles by Christoph Engel

Christoph Engel

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, Students; Universität Osnabrück - Faculty of Law

Date Written: June 17, 2018

Abstract

The most famous element in Bentham’s theory of punishment, the Panopticon Prison, expresses his view of the two purposes of punishment, deterrence and special prevention. This paper investigates Bentham’s intuition in a public goods lab experiment, by manipulating how much information on punishment experienced by others is available to would-be offenders. Compared with the tone that Jeremy Bentham set, the result is non-expected: If would-be offenders learn about contributions and punishment of others at the individual level, they contribute much less to the public project.

Keywords: Punishment, Deterrence, Special Prevention, Jeremy Bentham, Experiment, Public Good

JEL Classification: C91, H41, K14, K42

Suggested Citation

Engel, Christoph, Turning the Lab into Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon: A Lab Experiment on the Transparency of Punishment (June 17, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3197884 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3197884

Christoph Engel (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

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Universität Osnabrück - Faculty of Law

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