The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency

GATE Working Paper No. 1812 – June 2018

26 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2018

See all articles by Mostapha Diss

Mostapha Diss

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)

Eric Kamwa

University of French West Indies

Abdelmonaim Tlidi

University of Marrakech

Date Written: March 6, 2018

Abstract

For committee or multiwinner elections, the Chamberlin-Courant rule (CCR), which combines the Borda rule and the proportional representation, aims to pick the most representative committee (Chamberlin and Courant, 1983). Chamberlin and Courant (1983) have shown that if the size of the committee to be elected is k = 1 among m ≥ 3 candidates, the CCR is equivalent to the Borda rule ; Kamwa and Merlin (2014) claimed that if k = m − 1, the CCR is equivalent to the k-Plurality rule. In this paper, we explore what happens for 1 < k < m − 1 by computing the probability of agreement between the CCR and four k-scoring rules : k-Plurality, k-Borda, k-Negative Plurality and Bloc. Our results show that for committees of at least two members, the CCR usually leads to a committee recommended by the k-Plurality rule. Furthermore, we evaluate the probability of the CCR to select the Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein when it exists. The Condorcet committee à la Gehrlein is a fixed size subset of candidates such that every meber defeats every non-member in pairwise comparisons. In this matter, our results indicate that the CCR performs less well than the k-Borda rule and the Bloc rule but better than the k-Plurality and the k-Negative Plurality rules.

Keywords: Committee, Representativeness, Borda, Condorcet, Chamberlin-Courant, k-Scoring Rule

JEL Classification: D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Diss, Mostapha and Kamwa, Eric and Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency (March 6, 2018). GATE Working Paper No. 1812 – June 2018 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3198184 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3198184

Mostapha Diss (Contact Author)

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE) ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

Eric Kamwa

University of French West Indies ( email )

France

Abdelmonaim Tlidi

University of Marrakech ( email )

4000 Marrakech
United States

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