E-Money: Legal Restrictions Theory and Monetary Policy
44 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2018
Date Written: June 19, 2018
This paper studies the efficiency of electronic money system by focusing on the decentralized setting of issuance. In the model competitive money issuers can create small denominated money (or e-money) backed by large denominated government bonds. Under the decentralized environment the issuers can also produce counterfeit collateral at a proportional cost. This moral hazard incentive requires the more government bonds for the issuers to provide the same amount of money. In general equilibrium the individual money issuers do not internalize the aggregate effect of money supply. Thus the equilibrium allocation is constrained inefficient with the moral hazard incentives. We suggest a pigouvian tax on money supply to correct the externality in aggregate money supply.
Keywords: Limited Commitment, Moral Hazard, Externality, Open-market Operations
JEL Classification: E4, E5
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation