Public Goods Games and Psychological Utility: Theory and Evidence

57 Pages Posted: 2 Jul 2018

See all articles by Sanjit Dhami

Sanjit Dhami

University of Leicester

Mengxing Wei

University of Leicester - Division of Economics, School of Business, Students

Ali al-Nowaihi

University of Leicester - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 07, 2018

Abstract

We consider a theoretical model of a public goods game that incorporates reciprocity, guilt-aversion/surprise-seeking, and the attribution of intentions behind these emotions. In order to test our predictions, we implement the ‘induced beliefs method’ and a within-subjects design, using the strategy method. We find that all our psychological variables contribute towards the explanation of contributions. Guilt-aversion is pervasive at the individual-level and the aggregate-level and it is relatively more important than surprise-seeking. Our between-subjects analysis confirms the results of the within-subjects design.

Keywords: public goods games, psychological game theory, reciprocity, surprise-seeking/guilt-aversion, attribution of intentions, induced beliefs method, within and between subjects designs

JEL Classification: D010, D030, H410

Suggested Citation

Dhami, Sanjit and Wei, Mengxing and al-Nowaihi, Ali, Public Goods Games and Psychological Utility: Theory and Evidence (May 07, 2018). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 7014, April 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3198508

Sanjit Dhami (Contact Author)

University of Leicester ( email )

Department of Economics
Leicester LE1 7RH, Leicestershire LE1 7RH
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/economics/people/sdhami

Mengxing Wei

University of Leicester - Division of Economics, School of Business, Students ( email )

United Kingdom

Ali Al-Nowaihi

University of Leicester - Department of Economics ( email )

Department of Economics
Leicester LE1 7RH, Leicestershire LE1 7RH
United Kingdom

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