Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction

62 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2018

See all articles by Dirk Bergemann

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Juuso Valimaki

Helsinki School of Economics; University of Southampton - Division of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 19, 2018

Abstract

We provide an introduction to the recent developments in dynamic mechanism design, with a primary focus on the quasilinear case. First, we describe socially optimal (or efficient) dynamic mechanisms. These mechanisms extend the well-known Vickrey-Clark-Groves and D’Aspremont-Gérard-Varet mechanisms to a dynamic environment. Second, we discuss revenue optimal mechanisms. We cover models of sequential screening and revenue maximizing auctions with dynamically changing bidder types. We also discuss models of information management where the mechanism designer can control (at least partially) the stochastic process governing the agents’ types. Third, we consider models with changing populations of agents over time. After discussing related models with risk-averse agents and limited liability, we conclude with a number of open questions and challenges that remain for the theory of dynamic mechanism design.

Keywords: Dynamic Mechanism Design, Sequential Screening, Dynamic Pivot Mechanism, Bandit Auctions, Information Management, Dynamic Pricing

JEL Classification: D44, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Valimaki, Juuso, Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction (June 19, 2018). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2102R. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3198799 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3198799

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3592 (Phone)
203-432-2128 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Juuso Valimaki

Helsinki School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 21210
Helsinki 00100, 00101
Finland

University of Southampton - Division of Economics ( email )

Southampton, SO17 1BJ
United Kingdom
+44 23 8059 3263 (Phone)

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