Designing Economic Regulatory Institutions for European Network Industries

Regulation Initiative Working Paper Series No. 33

26 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2002

See all articles by David Coen

David Coen

University College London - Department of Science, Technology, Engineering and Public Policy (STEaPP)

Chris Doyle

University of Warwick - Centre for Management under Regulation (CMUR)

Date Written: October 1999

Abstract

This paper examines the design of the regulatory framework governing European network industries, taking account of structures that are more and less centralised than the status quo. We develop a framework within which the key criteria shaping regulatory structures are discussed. Given these criteria we are interested in addressing who is managing and who should be managing 'multi-level' regulation in Europe. Having outlined the criteria that oughht to be satisfied by a 'good' regulatory regime, we argue qualitatively that the institutional framework of regulation falls into one of four categories. We then assess how each of these categories perform in terms of the criteria we establish. Throughout our discussion the principle actors in the regulatory game are examined.

Suggested Citation

Coen, David and Doyle, Chris, Designing Economic Regulatory Institutions for European Network Industries (October 1999). Regulation Initiative Working Paper Series No. 33. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=319883 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.319883

David Coen (Contact Author)

University College London - Department of Science, Technology, Engineering and Public Policy (STEaPP) ( email )

London, W1T 6EY
United Kingdom
020 7679 4967 (Phone)
020 7679 4969 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/people/david_coen.php

Chris Doyle

University of Warwick - Centre for Management under Regulation (CMUR) ( email )

Warwick Business School
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
229
Abstract Views
1,401
rank
134,571
PlumX Metrics