Neither Populist Nor Neoclassical: The Classical Roots of the Competition Principle in American Antitrust Law

History of Political Economy, forthcoming (accepted version)

History of Political Economy, 2024 [10.1215/00182702-11330101]

29 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2018 Last revised: 7 Jun 2024

See all articles by Nicola Giocoli

Nicola Giocoli

University of Pisa - Department of Law

Date Written: February 04, 2024

Abstract

Contemporary critics of American antitrust law lament a supposed misinterpretation by modern, welfare-driven enforcers of the true meaning of the competition principle. This essay contributes to the debate by reconstructing the principle's historical origin. While it did not feature in the Sherman Act, the competition principle was introduced by the Supreme Court during the early years of antitrust law. The court formulated alternative versions of the principle; the one that eventually prevailed was neither populist nor neoclassical, as it was based on classical political economy and, in particular, on freedom of contract and “natural” values. This historical circumstance may pave the way for a new approach to antitrust law.

Keywords: Competition Principle, Sherman Act, Formative Era Of Antitrust Law, Justice Rufus W. Peckham, Freedom Of Contract, Classical Political Economy

JEL Classification: B12, K21, L40

Suggested Citation

Giocoli, Nicola, Neither Populist Nor Neoclassical: The Classical Roots of the Competition Principle in American Antitrust Law (February 04, 2024). History of Political Economy, forthcoming (accepted version), History of Political Economy, 2024 [10.1215/00182702-11330101], Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3199703 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-11330101

Nicola Giocoli (Contact Author)

University of Pisa - Department of Law ( email )

via Collegio Ricci 10
Pisa PI, 56126
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://https://pisa.academia.edu/NicolaGiocoli

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