How Much Does Your Boss Make? The Effects of Salary Comparisons

120 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2018 Last revised: 26 Dec 2019

See all articles by Zoe Cullen

Zoe Cullen

Harvard University - Business School (HBS)

Ricardo Perez-Truglia

University of California, Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 20, 2018

Abstract

The vast majority of the pay inequality in an organization comes from differences in pay between employees and their bosses. But are employees aware of these pay disparities? Are employees demotivated by this inequality? To address these questions, we conducted a field experiment with a sample of 2,060 employees from a multibillion-dollar corporation. We make use of the firm's administrative records alongside survey data and information-provision experiments. First, we document large misperceptions among the employees about the salaries of their managers and smaller but still significant misperceptions of the salaries of their peers. Second, we show that these perceptions have a significant causal effect on the employees' own behavior. When they find out that their managers earn more than they thought, employees work harder on average. We provide evidence that these effects are consistent with career-concerns models. In contrast, employees work less hard when they find out that their peers earn more. We conclude by discussing implications for pay inequality and pay transparency.

Keywords: salary, comparisons, inequality, transparency

JEL Classification: J31, J38, M12, M52, Z13

Suggested Citation

Cullen, Zoe and Perez-Truglia, Ricardo, How Much Does Your Boss Make? The Effects of Salary Comparisons (June 20, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3200136 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3200136

Zoe Cullen

Harvard University - Business School (HBS) ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/profile.aspx?facId=879471

Ricardo Perez-Truglia (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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